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Abstract 
 
This paper concerns the differences in the development of the Algerian and Egyptian uprisings within the 
context of the Arab Spring revolts. 
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The image of Arab youth engaged in riotous 
protests is not an uncommon one to an American 
observer. After the second half of the past century 
brought an endless stream of images and reports on the 
recurring civil unrest across the Middle East and North 
Africa, the spectator has been nearly desensitized to 
chaos in the region. That, coupled with ignorance 
towards political differences amongst the nations of the 
Arab world, has led to the blanket term “Arab Spring” 
to generalize the diverse upheavals occurring since 
January 2011. This broad moniker fails to address the 
various political tactics that defined the distinct 
movements. Furthermore, the media coverage focused 
only on the violence of conflicts in nations, namely 
Egypt and Tunisia, and disregarded the more reform-
based struggles in Algeria, Oman, and Morocco. 
Spectators may observe these two natures of conflict 
best in the Algerian and Egyptian upheavals, where 
contrasting political histories and governmental 
reprisals provide the variables in the distinct conflict 
resolutions. A year has now passed since the first 
uprisings; these conflicts deserve their own 
examinations to understand better their impact on Arab 
politics.     
 Fraught with deep divisions between 
religious and secular, and urban and rural 
demographics, the history of Algeria and Egypt stems 
from similar post-colonial pasts. The maintenance of 
these states’ unity in the face of such social tug-of-war 
has defined their history since independence. The 
largely autocratic political structures, which played the 
antagonists in the media coverage of the recent Arab 
Spring, have extended throughout the nations’ recent 
memories. The difference in these two uprisings can 
only be analyzed when considering the differences in 
the two nations’ histories since the end of the Cold 
War.  
The now famous Egyptian Uprising began 
long before Twitter, Facebook, or any of the most 
recent participants were born. The principal actor, 
Hosni Mubarak, became president in 1981, inheriting a 
legacy of autocratic secular control begun by the Arab 
Nationalist and socialist Gamal Abdel Nasser. Mubarak 
followed after Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, and 
preserved the nation’s precarious secularism against the 
Islamism of the increasingly popular Muslim 
Brotherhood. The organization, founded in 1928, 
appealed heavily to the religious working class 
constituting a populous demographic in the nation, 
despite its official illegality.1 This position put Mubarak 
in even more favorable standing with the United States 
in its war on terror against Islamist organizations in the 
area. The friendship would prove highly unpopular, 
though, with the numerous opponents of U.S. 
interventionism in the Arab world. Despite this, the 
significant U.S. funding for the Egyptian military 
outweighed the threat of civil unpopularity, playing a 
key role in the future post-Mubarak government.2 To 
protect his position against this popular movement, he 
maintained the state’s practice of stringent limits on 
free assembly and speech and continued election cycles 
that carried no faith in the international community.3  
Mubarak’s relative ambivalence toward Israel 
along with the Palestinian sovereignty movement that 
inundated the northern part of the nation with Gazan 
refugees weighed heavily on the minds of the religious 
demographic.4 His “Cold Peace” with Israel, so decried 
by Arab Nationalists and Islamists alike, smacked of 
Realpolitik and betrayed the will of the Palestinian-
sympathetic populace. These policies alienated his 
position from both the liberal urban youth for their 
blatant violation of democratic liberties, and the 
religious working class for their refusal to recognize the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s interests.5 This demographic 
dichotomy would prove crucial to the development and 
aftermath of the Egyptian Revolution. 
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 The background of the contrasting Algerian 
uprising bears striking similarities with its Egyptian 
counterpart. A recent memory of extreme violence in 
Algeria absent in modern Egyptian history, however, 
contributed significantly to the relative peacefulness of 
the Algerian movement. The roots extend to 1991, 
when a turbulent political past erupted into a vicious 
civil war across the nation. This civil war broke out 
when the Islamic National Front, an Islamist political 
party, ascended the majority in the national 
government. The military, typically a lonely force for 
secular power in Arab nations, deposed the Islamist 
government and imposed strict “state of emergency 
laws” which restricted freedom of assembly and 
political participation. The coup led Islamist groups to a 
civil war against the government; over ten years, this 
resulted in over 150,000 deaths and the collapse of the 
constitutional government.6 Despite the signing of an 
armistice in 2002 which ended the civil war, President 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the militarily-appointed leader, 
retains his political position. Moreover, the state of 
emergency laws lasted long past the ceasefire, and their 
maintenance within Algerian social life would provide 
the recent movement with its most concrete objective. 
Given the inequitable distribution of violence between 
both Algeria and Egypt, the first factor in the variance 
of conflict resolution appears. 
 In both Algeria and Egypt, overcoming the 
tenuous relationship between state and population 
appeared insurmountable until December of 2010, 
when the “Arab Spring” would first arise. Despite the 
broad narrative of international media coverage, the 
upheavals that would encompass the Arab Spring began 
not as a heroic standoff between the forces of 
democracy and autocracy, or between the young 
“Tweeters” and the old regime. Rather, it was the 
constant struggle for reasonable food prices and better 
employment opportunities that first mobilized the 
activists in the testing grounds of the revolution.7 
Sharing in the economic crisis which the United States 
and countless other nations experienced, the Tunisian 
demonstrators demanded economic concessions like 
price-ceilings and subsidies. Yet, it would be the 
government and not the protesters that would provide 
the necessary ingredient for a successful rebellion—
martyrs. Specifically, activists like Mohammed 
Bouazizi, whose self-immolation in the face of police 
corruption would grant him the posthumous title 
“Martyr of the Middle Eastern Revolutions”.8   
 The violent response of the Tunisian police 
and security personnel to otherwise peaceful reform-
based demonstrations launched the movement directly 
at the basis of the nation’s authoritarian government. 
This experiment identified the severity of the 
government response to political movements as the 
defining factor in each of the Arab Spring revolts. This 
trend rang particularly true for the Egyptian and 
Algerian revolutions. To contrast these governmental 
responses, it would be best to begin chronologically, 
and to understand the ineffective response in Egypt and 
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then the relatively effective response in Algeria.  
 With the ouster of Tunisian President Ben 
Ali on January 14 after two months of protest, the 
people of North Africa could begin to realize their 
collective strength in the process of reformation. Only a 
week later on January 25, the Egyptians began the mass 
demonstrations in Cairo’s Tahrir Square against 
rampant unemployment, political repression, and 
corruption.9 Counteracting the organizers of the 
demonstrations, the Mubarak government established a 
national block on all Internet access to hinder the flow 
of information. This shortsighted tactic was a 
significant mistake made by Mubarak. The 
comprehensive silencing of activists would provoke a 
common narrative against governmental repression, and 
garnered international sympathy from the social media 
so accessible to global spectators.10        
 At this point, the Egyptian Revolution took 
on its distinctive and historically significant character, 
becoming a spontaneous social movement led not by a 
“vanguard party” but rather by a general dissatisfaction 
with the political structure. The presence of mass 
political assembly challenged the notion of police 
enforcement of the anti-assembly restrictions. This 
populous, free-flowing movement gained strength with 
every attack, restriction, and martyr provided by the 
political establishment.  By February, the Mubarak 
regime realized that the consequences of the Tunisian 
Revolution had evolved into a regional crisis. The 
regime offered concessions, namely the formation of a 
new government and the pledge to hold open election 
within the next cycle. As the number of concessions 
increased, so did the radicalization of marginalized 
students, lawyers, labor unionists, Christians, Islamists 
and countless others that constituted the movement, 
leading to demonstrations of over 50,000 across the 
nation per day.9 With the mounting grievances of 
demonstrators, reform no longer proved to be a 
possibility. Instead, protesters adopted the chant 
initiated by their Tunisian comrades: Ash-sha`b yurid 
isqat an-nizam, or in English, “The people want the fall 
of the regime”.12   
Just as every demographic on the political 
spectrum fully invested itself in the movement, so too 
did the formerly loyalist force of the Egyptian military, 
which abandoned its foundering president when faced 
with the possibility of international censure. More 
beholden to its financial suppliers, primarily the United 
States, with over $1.3 billion in direct military aid, than 
to its tenuously associated president, the military began 
to openly oppose orders to use live ammunition against 
demonstrators.13 Without this foundation of autocratic 
authority, the only forces left to oppose the revolution 
were the armed militias that continued to support the 
Mubarak regime. In what would famously be dubbed 
the “Battle of the Camel”, mounted militias assaulted 
demonstrators gathered in Cairo, killing several people 
and instigating the first instance of large-scale intra-
state violence in recent Egyptian memory.  
Within a month, the wave of discontent proved 
unstoppable. Under popular and military pressure, 
President Mubarak cut short his twenty-year term and 
resigned, leaving the country with succession dilemmas 
that have yet to be solved. Eleven days later on 
February 22, in response to building pressure in his 
country, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria 
announced from a much more secure position that the 
state of emergency laws which had curtailed civil rights 
would finally be terminated.14 After very few deaths 
and this legal retraction secured, the demonstrators 
ceased major violent activity, accepted their equally 
authoritarian president, and went home victorious in 
destroying a tool for state repression. When compared 
to its volatile neighbor to the east, one must ask, why 
were outcomes different? 
There is a reason that Algeria has gotten nearly 
no media coverage in the United States while Egypt 
came to the forefront in the minds of Americans. No 
political figurehead was toppled, no violent clashes 
were instigated, and most importantly, no government 
was overthrown in Algeria. Despite the ubiquity of 
radical revolutions across North Africa and the primacy 
of violence in Algeria’s political history, the story of 
the Algerian uprising was one of compromised reform 
and top-down moderation. 
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The beginnings of Algerian public 
demonstrations occurred simultaneously with the 
publicized protests of neighboring Tunisians. It 
mirrored the grievances over unemployment and food 
prices, and continued to grow after the Tunisian 
president vacated from power.15 With more foresight 
than his Egyptian counter-part, President Bouteflika 
recognized the threat such momentum could pose to his 
regime. Rather than simply ignoring or instantly 
repressing the demands of the illegally assembling 
students and trade unionists, early on Bouteflika 
presented concessions to the more economical demands 
of the developing movement. On January 8, before 
Tunisia would become an example for the reform 
movement, President Bouteflika announced sharp cuts 
in the taxes on basic foodstuffs, sating the hunger of 
protesters who would contribute to a potential 
uprising.16   
This gesture, though seemingly insignificant 
considering the legitimacy of broader grievances, 
played a crucial role in the peaceful outcome of the 
upheaval. The response by Bouteflika demonstrated 
something more than just a handout; rather, it illustrated 
the bilateral process necessary for reform. The regime 
responded to the public gathering not with outright 
violence, but with a concession, showing that the 
government gave significant consideration to the will of 
the people. Moreover, the government made every 
effort to successfully refrain from making any martyrs 
for the demonstrators’ cause.17 In essence, the Algerian 
government saw the protesters not as an inherently 
hostile force, but rather as a democratic voice with 
which to contend.  
The Algerian government’s final decision to 
repeal the state of emergency laws, though scantily 
publicized, proved a historic moment in North Africa 
equal to the fall of Mubarak. It proved the possibility of 
popular resistance to authoritarian pressure and political 
action for public demands. Though this side of the 
broad term “Arab Spring” is rarely publicized, it shows 
a successful, non-violent path for future popular Arab 
struggles. Without this study of authoritarian reactions 
and their effects, spectators can learn nothing about the 
Arab Spring and mass direct action as a whole. 
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